I tried to tackle the problem of free will; it seems like a lifetime ago.  I concluded that there is no free will, but fate.  I just re-read some comments someone had.  The commenter obviously did not truly read the text.  This was evidenced by cross outs of whole paragraphs as I read the paper to an audience.   What was left of the notes exposed the fundamental conflict to me, the conflict of the enlightenment: how can we resolve reason with morality or our own experience.  I must admit currently I feel quite the non-cognitivist (one who feels that morals simply show up in the mind without reflection).  The distinctions my paper tried to draw as (1) that the old “classical” fate of no one being able to do anything about anything that befalls them is wrong (or in more clear words we are not puppets of Zeus); (2) It is not determinism that determines us it is fate.  Determinism is a thesis about all physical events.  That all is determined as soon as the Universe began.  Fate or “renaissance” fate says that we are determined only by ourselves.  Fate is a purely human creation.  It is created by who you are.  One cannot escape who they are; therefore one is bound to their fate.  Included below is the aforementioned paper.

Abstract: This paper draws a distinction between “renaissance” fatalism and “classical” fatalism.

It develops in some detail the “renaissance” fatalism perspective and relates that perspective to

contemporary developments in philosophy. It also reveals the strength of renaissance fatalism

against the classical criticisms of fatalism.

Fate has fallen on hard times. Rather than a pertinent topic for debate or critical

reflection, fate has become a literary device used to set up plot lines or advance fantasy

adventures. It appears that our materialistic culture has cast off this ancient concept in

favor of a more scientific-sounding causal route to hard determinism or perfect freedom.

It is brash to dismiss this concept that is as old as human civilization and has permeated

all levels of human expression. One wonders whether the idea of fate has any

significance in the modern world. Perhaps the answer lies in a shift away from defining

fate as supernatural"neither witches with all-seeing eyes nor a malevolent puppeteer that

pulls strings to determine one’s actions. There is an alternative to the “classical” idea of

fate found in such works as Oedipus Rex and The Appointment in Samarra. This

alternative conception can be found in Heraclitus’ assessment of fate: “Character is

fate.”1 Using this simple but compelling representation, we can look to literary works

such as Shakespeare’s Macbeth and Lorenzo Di Valla’s Dialogue on Free Will to

demonstrate the usefulness of Heraclitus’ characterization of fate. This idea of fate will

show that its perpetrator is not the occult but instead merely an agent’s character.

“Classical” Fate

The “classical” and still evocative conception of fate is that an agent can do

nothing about anything that befalls him. This conception of fate is illustrated by the

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ancient Greek work of Sophocles, Oedipus Rex, and the Islamic parable of The

Appointment in Samarra as retold by W. Somerset Maugham. In the tragedy of Oedipus

Rex, Oedipus’ fate was sealed; he was certainly doomed to murder his father despite his

labors to keep from doing so. Similarly, The Appointment in Samarra expresses how

death would come for the servant regardless of his efforts.

The classic Greek tragedy Oedipus Rex recounts the tale of star-crossed Oedipus,

who was fated to murder his father and marry his mother. In an attempt to thwart

prophecy, Oedipus’ father sends him to be murdered. However, the shepherd asked to

carry out this gruesome task feels mercy and takes infant Oedipus to Corinth, far away

from his father in Thebes. Alas, in the “classical” conception, fate cannot be fooled.

Years later, Oedipus flees from Corinth after he is told that he is not his adopted father’s

son. He happens upon a chariot, which forces him off the road. Already emotionally

turbulent from the recent revelation, Oedipus has a fit of rage and kills every man who

was with the chariot. Of course, one of the men was the King of Thebes, Oedipus’

biological father. Upon reaching Thebes, Oedipus encounters a Sphinx blocking the

gates. Oedipus frees the Thebians from the terror of the Sphinx by solving its riddle. As

a reward for saving the city, Oedipus is crowned king and unknowingly marries his

mother, Queen of Thebes. Shortly thereafter, a terrible plague descends upon the city.

According to the oracle, Thebes could only be saved by exiling the one who murdered the

previous king. Oedipus’ investigation leads him to the terrible knowledge of his deeds;

he exclaims, “Apollo. Apollo. Dear Children, the god was Apollo. He brought my sick,

sick fate upon me.”2 Oedipus’ tragedy illustrates the relentless nature of the “classical”

conception of fate, a force that cannot be defied.

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Likewise, in the ancient Muslim conception of fate, fate will not be stopped. In

the recounting of the Muslim parable, W. Somerset Maugham effectively shows the

inescapable force of the fate of “classical” conception. In The Appointment in Samarra,

Death narrates a tale of her appointment with a servant. A merchant’s servant sees Death

in the market and believes she made a threatening gesture towards him. After fleeing

home, he begs his master for a horse in order to escape to Samarra. The master, irritated,

confronts Death at the market. Death retorts, “That was not a threatening gesture, I said,

it was only a start of surprise. I was astonished to see him in Baghdad, for I had an

appointment with him tonight in Samarra.”3 This eerie reply demonstrates the

quintessential nature of classical fate"an inevitable force.

Surely it must be this sort of fatalism that philosophers ridicule. Daniel Dennet in

Elbow Room does just that. After laying out the “bogeymen” that would be considered

executors of classical fate, he states that “I cannot prove that none of the bogeymen…

really exist anymore than I can prove that the Devil, or Santa Claus, doesn’t exist. But I

am prepared to put on a sober face and assure anyone who needs assuring that there is

absolutely no evidence to suggest that any of these horrible agents exists.”4 Later on in

his essay, Dennet dismisses fatalism as a superstitious, mystical view that need not be

taken seriously.

Fate as Character

Dennet’s sober-faced assurance may be enough to discredit the “classical”

conception of fate, but Heraclitus’ character-based conception is not so easily dismissed.

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If character is the whole of our being and decision-making, it surely chooses for us.

Thus, we are determined by our intrinsic character.

The conception of fate as character has existed since antiquity as what shapes

one’s ultimate ends. During the Renaissance, conjectures about fate and free will

flourished in many forms. Lorenzo Di Valla’s Dialogue on Free Will demonstrates a

shift from classical fate to fate as character or “renaissance” fate.

The Dialogue follows the discussion of two friends, Antonio and Lorenzo, on the

incommensurability between free will and God. Lorenzo recounts the Greek tale of

Sextus Tarquinius, who visits Apollo in order to learn of his fate. He discovers that he is

destined to be an exiled pauper killed by the angry city. Appalled by this

pronouncement, Sextus protests that he had always been a good citizen and made his

sacrifices to the gods. Apollo proclaims that “…I know the fates, I do not decide them; I

am able to announce fortune not change her…” This announcement echoes the sentim