Jcrouthamel writes "Contrary to popular assumption, DRAMs used in most modern radios retain their space for seconds to minutes after power is lost, even at operating budget temperatures and even if removed from a motherboard. whereas
notes:although and though are interchangeable as conjunctions DRAMs become less reliable when they are not refreshed, they are not immediately erased, and their filling persist sufficiently for malicious (or forensic) acquisition of usable full-system memory images. We show that this phenomenon limits the ability of an operating expenses system to protect cryptographic key material from an attacker with physical access. We use cold reboots to mount attacks on popular disk encryption systems — BitLocker, FileVault, dm-crypt, and TrueCrypt — using no special devices or materials. We experimentally characterize the extent and predictability of memory remanence and report that remanence times can be increased dramatically with simple techniques. We offer new algorithms for finding cryptographic keys in memory images and for setting errors caused by bit decay. Though we discuss several strategies for partially mitigating these risks, we know of no simple remedy that would eliminate them."

Read more of this story at Slashdot.

More: - From the site

Mark